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A Theoretical Framework for Understanding (Lack of) Change 






Since collapse of communism, some theoretical and empirical knowledge has been accumulated which make it possible to 
elaborate certain observations over the processes of post-Communist transformation in post-Soviet countries. Despite the 
heavy criticism and uncovered fallacies of transitology in the academic literature, its ideas on sources of change based on 
neoliberal presumptions of linearity of change sustain in policy-making and academic circles, while many countries that sup-
posedly embarked on the path of democratic transition towards this “endpoint” have stalled in their progress. To address this 
issue, in this paper we highlight that  the transformation or persistence of rules depends on a number of interdependent factors. 
To assess the degree of transformation or persistence of rules, first it is pointed at the prevalence of politics over economy and 
hazardous impact of homogenization attitudes towards institutional change. Second, four interrelated issues are particularly 
highlighted as necessary factors for understanding the prospect and potential sustainability of change in the region: the level of 
inclusiveness of political institutions (political democracy), development of institutions and their capacities to regulate, level of 
inclusiveness of economic institutions (market economy) and strength of civil society and external factors, such as the ongoing 
EU-Russia competition in the case of the post-soviet countries. 
Keywords:  ex-Soviet countries, post-communist transition, post-soviet studies, transformation
Introduction
This paper looks at the issue of the persistence of rules in 
post-soviet space with the aim of better understanding post-
soviet transformations. By underlining the importance of insti-
tutions and legacies, it brings the discussion beyond debate 
on transitology, which emerged in 1990s and tries to connect 
the former debate with current research on post-soviet trans-
formations with aim to point at the reoccurring mistakes in 
prescribing solutions for the post-soviet malaises. Transitol-
ogy as special study emerged in the wake of the fall of com-
munism in Europe and represents a specific term for a field 
of post-communism transition studies. Besides it consti-
tutes a subdiscipline of social science concerned with guiding 
policy recommendations in a process of democratization and 
market liberalization in the Central and East European 
post-socialist countries (CEE) and in the former USSR. To 
achieve that, it had sought to develop theories capable of 
explaining transitions from authoritarianism to democracy 
and underdevelopment to modern developed European 
statehood. 
However, what it mainly achieved is a provision of a gen-
* Invited lecturer at the International Black Sea University, Tbilisi, Georgia.
E-mail: akavadze@gmail.com
** Invited lecturer at Tbilisi State University under EU-PREACC project. 
   E-mail: ryhor@ut.ee
*** Senior Associate, Albany Associates, London, United Kingdom.  
   E-mail: tina.kavadze@gmail.com
Amiran KAVADZE, Ryhor NIZHNIKAU, Tina KAVADZE
34
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878, e-ISSN: 2346-8262; Volume 4, Issue 2, 2015
eral overview of the transition process without in-depth analy-
sis of countries’ peculiarities. No special emphasis was made 
to political culture, levels of economic development, demo-
graphic-ethnic balance, and styles of political leadership, and 
institutions and legacies and Russia’s dominance in the six 
post-Soviet countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Geor-
gia, Moldova and Ukraine). The process of change, 
which was underway since early 90s in the post-communist 
region, has been quite painful, unexpectedly long, with plenty 
of internal and external factors affecting speed of develop-
ment and Eurocentric tendencies in the EU Eastern Par-
tnership (EaP) member countries.
So, while the literature has arrived to a conclusion of 
transitology to become too extended in scope to potentially 
even end up as a pseudo-science to guide the way from one 
regime to another or from some form of autocracy to some 
form of democracy (Schmitter P. , 2011). Its conclusions are 
still widely used to explain the contemporary events of post-
soviet colour revolutions or even the Arab Spring. The media 
and policymaking circles use it for an objective to promote 
Western-like democracy and market reforms. And again as in 
1990s, in 2010s their suggestions and practical recommen-
dations do not match the experience many post-communist 
countries gained and fail to explain the emerging outcomes.
As it is presented in this review article, the transforma-
tion or persistence of rules depends on a number of interde-
pendent factors. To assess the degree of transformation or 
persistence of rules, four interrelated issues are particularly 
highlighted: the level of inclusiveness of political institutions 
(political democracy), development of institutions and their 
capacities to regulate, level of inclusiveness of economic in-
stitutions (market economy) and strength of civil society and 
external factors. Besides, it is significant to underline the im-
portance and determination of each actor’s ability to adjust 
to the new transforming rules of the game. Furthermore, it 
points at the prevalence of politics to economy and hazard-
ous impact of homogenization projects of institutional change.
This article is built on a following way: first, it briefly 
outlines and refutes the key assumption of the transitology 
literature. Then it reviews the key findings in the literatures 
on regime change, international development and political 
economy to highlight the three broad factors which help to 
explain the rule persistence and finally support them with the 
examples from the region. 
Debating Post-Soviet Transformation: Reoccurring 
Fallacies of Transitology:
Of all the elements of the international wave of democrati-
zation that began some two decades ago, the outcomes of 
the transformation of communist political and economic sys-
tems are the most dramatic and also puzzling. Since 1989, 
more than two dozen countries within the former Soviet bloc 
have dismantled, with varying results, the communist politi-
cal system and socialist economic planning. In many cases 
this transformation has led to a reinvention of debate about 
the diffusion of liberal institutions and transition toward the es-
tablishment of a liberal-democratic order (Dawisha & Parrott, 
1997)
However, the forthcoming divergence of outcomes on 
transition towards democracy and market economy in post-
soviet space has started a debate on the sources of change 
and persistence of old rules and sustainability of new ones. 
As it is observed 25 years after the start of transition, while 
Baltic states became full-fledged democracies, joined the EU 
and built market economies, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Central 
Asian states except Kyrgyzstan built a different kinds of au-
thoritarian regimes. Meanwhile Ukraine, Moldova, Geo-
rgia, Russia and Armenia balanced between different regi-
mes. This divergence has sparked abundance of research, 
among which in early 1990s transitology vs transformation 
debate stood out. 
One of the key elements that came out of the above-men-
tioned debate is that with some notable exceptions, Western 
thinking about attempts to democratize these polities has gen-
erally been based on the experience of the countries in other 
regions – of North America, Western and Southern Europe, 
and Latin America (Schmitter & Karl, 1994). Among schol-
ars and policymakers alike, there has been an unconscious 
tendency to view post-communist political developments 
through interpretive lenses derived from the experiences of 
countries that have not undergone the same historical trans-
formations and hence derive the solutions on the basis of that 
(see, for example, Washington Consensus) (Dawisha & Par-
rott, 1997). Yet, while this literature on transitology has widely 
criticised already in mid-1990s, the literature on democracy 
and reforms has received a new life with the economic and 
political liberalization reforms in 2000s including studies on 
the relationship between different types of democracies and 
structural reforms and the EU attempted transformation of 
post-soviet countries through Association Agreements (Amin 
& Djankov, 2014).
Despite the fallacies, still some of the assumptions are 
repeated in the debates on reforms in the post-soviet space, 
which result in unintended policy consequences of such re-
forms. These assumptions are based on the arguments de-
veloped during previous decades, which particularly highlight 
that:
• Historical progress is a final destination to liberal de-
mocracy (Jordan, 2004).
 • Any country moving away from dictatorship can be con-
sidered as a country in transition to democracy (Carothers, 
2002). 
•The eastern European countries and the republics of the
ex-Soviet Union overlap considerably with the previous cases 
of transition occurred in other regions (Latin America and 
Southern Europe), which is tended to be repeated in the 
propositions of borrowing and emulating reforms from other 
regions (Schmitter & Karl, 1994).
• The transition consists of specific sequence of stages,
so-called linearity of democratization: opening (liberali-
zation), breakthrough and transition to new regime and 
consolidation characterized by political party development, 
strengthening of civil society, judiciary reform and free media 
(Rupnik, 2007).
• Transfer of power through the election process as a
source of legitimacy for government that broadens political 
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participation and accountability (Carothers, 2002).
• Certain factors as culture, history, institutional practice
and experience, ethnic and religious traditions do not 
represent primary factors influencing transition to liberal 
democracy (Schmitter & Karl, 1994)
• Economic liberalization will improve political one (Non-
neman, 1996).
Here, it is important to once again highlight a few cru-
cial points. First, above-mentioned assumptions imply the 
existence of institutional homogeneity and linearity of his-
tory, which leads towards a particular end-point, hence 
mak-ing comparisons with other regions and countries. As 
transitology thoughts suggest, the democratization in Eas-
tern Europe should be compared with South Europe and 
Latin America experience (Schmitter & Karl, 1994). How-
ever, it neglects the existing cultural, historic, geopolitical 
and national peculiarities, which should be taken into con-
sideration in both understanding the process of change and 
designing reforms. 
Second, it is an assumption of the dominance of the 
Western knowledge. For example, according to the advisor to 
the economic reforms of early 1990s in Russia, later heavily 
criticised by Jeffrey Sachs, basic steps to the transformation 
of Eastern Europe’s and former Soviet Union’s centrally 
planned economies are two: ex-communist countries must 
reject any ideas about a “third way”, such as a “market 
socialism” based on public ownership or worker self-
management, and go straight for a western-style market 
economy (Sachs, 1990). Besides, there should be four 
basic points for rapid market transformation program: a) 
liberalization of prices based on free trade; b) set the 
private sector free by removing bureaucratic restrictions; c) 
bring the state sector under control, by denationalization 
and privatization and by imposing tougher disciplines on 
such state firms as remain; d) maintain overall macroeco-
nomic stability through restrictive credit and balanced 
budgets (Sachs, 1990). Yet, generalized to every case reform 
proposal does not fit  the local specificities and hence adapt 
to local peculiarities and needs.
As a continuation of this point, the third issue is the preva-
lence of market reform as a pre-condition for creating demo-
cratic system. The Western advisors have long prioritised the 
economic reforms as a necessity to build liberal democracy. 
Overall, the empirical evidence on the link between democ-
racy and reforms is unclear. Economic history provides us 
with examples of both authoritarian and democratic regimes 
that implemented major economic reforms. For example, 
successful economic liberalization was achieved under au-
thoritarian regimes in China, Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan and 
the military regimes as in Argentina, Chile and Brazil (Amin 
& Djankov, 2014). However, as the post-soviet transforma-
tion has shown, in absence of strong state institutions, it led 
to state capture and pervasive corruption. Hence, economic 
institutions are collective choices and therefore, the out-
come of a political process and the emergence of wild capital-
ism in 1990s and later state capitalism in 2000s represent the 
occurred political transformations (North & Weingast, 1989).
Differential economic development, therefore, is a conse-
quence of differential political development. Explaining com-
parative development entails an account of why some parts of 
the world developed political and institutional equilibria, which 
empowered those who were interested in socially desirable 
economic institutions and placed constraints on those who 
were not (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008). As Dawisha 
describes, it was Putin and his security elite, who launched 
a plan to remake the Presidential Administration and 
through it the Russian state from the earliest days of 2000 
(Dawisha, 2015). As she points, the leaked document Re-
form of the Administration of the President of the Russian 
Federation stated in writing what Putin ended up doing in 
practice: replacing the “self-regulating” nature of a demo-
cratic, market-driven, and rule-by-law system with manual 
control from the top. Written before he was even ina-
ugurated, the document stated that the president did not 
need to rely on a self-regulating political system that would 
later necessitate creation of state monopo-lies.
Fourth, it raises the issue of the role of legacies 
and complexity of institutions, which is actually ignored. 
Contrary to the Schmitter and Karl’s, Bunce is suggesting 
that there is a contradiction between the rational offered for 
comparing democratization, east and south, and the appro-
aches transitologies take when carrying their studies 
(Schmitter & Karl, 1994), (Bunce, 1995). The author then 
concludes that differences are quite deep between post 
communism and the transitions in the South than Schmitter 
and Karl can offer and it was a nature of the authoritarian 
rule: what distinguished the state socialism from burea-
ucratic authoritarianism and dictatorship in Latin America 
and in South its ideology, political economy, configuration of 
political and military elites, etc.
Yet, the domestic context in which transformation was at-
tempted was a very specific with a particular type of legacies 
and institutions. Until dissolution of the Soviet Union little con-
temporary thought had been given to the institutional capaci-
ties required for well-functioning democratic and economic 
institutions. At the beginning of transition black markets, law-
lessness and wild capitalism absorbed ex-communist coun-
tries. Judicial system was very weak: there were no rights to 
own and dispose of property; bankruptcy, competition, anti-
monopoly legislation and essential infrastructure of a market 
economy were missing. Law enforcement agencies did not 
have any experience in protecting and supporting of private 
property. Privatization process in early state of transition was 
always painful, on the other hand, the right to property in 
market economies is morally rooted in its culture and authori-
ties have all tools to ensure those market “rights.” For former 
Soviet Union republics (in contrast with Central and Eastern 
European ex-communist countries) the scenario was even 
worse: everything was governed from Moscow, local republi-
can level administration was very week, with no independent 
state institutions. 
Finally, North offers that economic change depends in 
general on “adaptive efficiency”, a society’s effectiveness in 
creating institutions to be transformed/replaced in response 
to the request of political and economic agenda (North, 2005). 
As he explains, institutions as the formal and informal rules 
that constrain human economic behavior affect the economic 
change. North introduces intentionality as the crucial variable 
and proceeds to demonstrate how intentionality emerges 
as the product of social learning and how it then shapes the 
economy’s institutional foundations and its capacity to adapt 
to the changing political and economic environment. We wish 
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to add here that “adaptive efficiency” and capacity to adapt to 
the new realities in many instances depends on the level of 
society’s “human development index” and socio-cultural pe-
culiarities and national features.  
Explaining Post-Soviet Persistence: State of 
Elites, Society and International Influence: 
Taking these points, the study expands on the literature based 
on the democracy-reforms nexus studying the importance of 
an expansion of political rights for regulatory reforms, gov-
ernment efficiency and economic growth (Amin & Djankov, 
2014). While observing the post-soviet reforms trajectories, 
the particular focus has been made on change in distribution 
of rights and hence the introduction and enforcement of rules. 
Regulations shape distribution of opportunities and wealth 
as well as allocation of rights and obligations among socio-
economic actors, hence are a subject of contestation from ac-
tors to reshape their design and impact their implementation 
upon the regime change (Gel’man, 2015), (Bruszt & McDer-
mott, 2014). As Bruszt and McDermott point, regulation is not 
just about market making and/or state making, not just about 
reduction of transaction costs but about protection of newly 
acquired rights (Bruszt & McDermott, 2014). 
Moreover, unlike transitology suggests, institutional lega-
cies are a key component that affect the direction of change 
as virtually everything is affected by the ruinous conditions 
and habits of the old regime. Legacies and history affect three 
conditions: (1) the state of material resources and their organ-
ization; (2) the “inner environment” of mental residues, includ-
ing the cognitive and normative culture, human capital, work 
habits, and social and political aspirations, collective identities 
and their potential for social conflict; and (3) the established 
elites and their informal power resources - the agents of the 
old regime, have not been defeated (Elster, Offe, & Preuss, 
1998).
To evaluate better the persistence of rules and the trajec-
tory of change, following Gel’man, Acemoglu and Robinson, 
as well as Levitsky and Way, a number of potential factors 
affect the distribution of power in political and economic in-
stitutions: the state of the elites, the degree of cooperation 
or conflict within them, the state of the society and its ability 
to demand or preserve its acquired rights, which are in turn 
interdependent with existing culture and legacies, and finally 
geopolitics and international influence, the level of linkage 
and leverage with the regional powers and their strategies 
(Gel’man, 2015), (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008), (Levitsky 
& Way, 2005). In this regard, change is not about liberaliza-
tion of trade or holding free elections, but about creating a 
level playing field by opening up markets to reduce costs and 
impose the same rules for all actors, which is accompanied 
by creating regulatory capacities to enforce the rules or ex-
ceeding costs of access to international markets (Bruszt & 
Holzhacker, 2009). 
The transformation of both economy and society depends 
on building of institutional environment and the institutions of 
governance (Williamson, 1998). As a consolidated political re-
gime is in equilibrium, the process of regime changes, which is 
based upon changes of the sets of actors, or institutions, or 
(often) both, is disequilibrium by definition. In this regard, the 
focus is on the newly emerging institutions and how political 
rights expand and are sustained. This is crucial to the study 
of post-soviet transformation and explaining persistence of 
post-Sovietism in the countries of the former USSR. At the 
same time, this is not to study the change in formal rules 
just, as the informal rules can play an equally important role 
(North, 1990). In this regard, it should be noted distinguishes 
between the social embeddedness, which includes informal 
institutions, customs, traditions, norms, and religion (William-
son, 2000). Institutions at this level change very slowly and 
the institutional environment, which includes formal rules of 
the game – constitution, laws, judiciary, bureaucracy etc. For-
mal rules (e.g., constitutions and laws) might be very differ-
ent from informal institutional arrangements, and sometimes 
even less important than the latter. Hence, the conditions and 
(sometimes) outcomes of the struggle for creating new institu-
tions depend upon a set of formal and informal “rules of the 
game,” namely political institutions (Gel’man, 2015). 
All these factors point at the ability to limit the exist-
ing power holders, demand and/or obtain the expansion of 
rights top-down and bottom-up during the process of regime 
change. However, speaking about the failures in post-soviet 
space, these factors were limited or non-existent (as in Turk-
menistan) after the dissolution of the USSR. In case of Be-
larus, the political conflicts within elites were resolved by the 
rise of Lukashenka and redistribution of carrots and punish-
ment of defectors. The role of society was minimal as it was 
bought by the relative prosperity through the social contract 
with the elites due to oil bonanza in 2000s. Moreover, while 
at times in 1990s it was dissatisfied with the government, the 
society didn’t consider any alternatives to that accepting the 
existing status quo. Finally, external influence from the West 
was not only minimal but completely overtaken by Russia’s 
support. The leverage and linkage to Russia was strong com-
pared to the West’s. 
In case of Georgia there were two main stages of post-
communism transformation. At the beginning Georgia under 
president Shevardnadze (despite the numerous domestic 
problems and irregularities) was trying to keep balance be-
tween the West and Russia and with fine diplomatic efforts 
slowly but steadily was pushing forward the EU integration 
process and the society in general followed him. However by 
2003 widespread corruption, poverty and disbelieves with the 
political elites to improve the situation with the falling down 
country forced people to went to the streets and overthrow 
the government. After the Rose Revolution of November 
2003 president Saakashvili gained full support from popula-
tion and the West who started quite actively, sometimes even 
aggressively implementing political and economic reforms, 
catalyzed as much as he could the EU and NATO integration 
process, but simultaneously Russia’s linkage was diminished. 
Tbilisi finally spoiled relationship with the Kremlin, waged the 
war in August 2008 with Russia with heavy consequences for 
the country. We can see here the fragile equilibrium of internal 
and external factors affecting the entire transformation pro-
cess, which we will discuss in details below. 
“A Theoretical Framework for Understanding (lack of) Change in post-Soviet Countries: 
from Democratic Transition to Rule Persistence”
37
Journal of Social Sciences; ISSN: 2233-3878, e-ISSN: 2346-8262; Volume 4, Issue 2, 2015
The Role of Elites:
Political power consists of de jure power regulated by formal 
political institutions and de facto political power, which comes 
from the ability of various social groups to solve their collec-
tive action problems through different means (e.g. from bribes 
to political parties). Changes in specific political institutions, 
for example, a change from non-democracy to democracy, af-
fects the distribution of de jure political power. This, however, 
may induce cohesive (and small) groups, such as elites, to 
increase their investments in de facto political power to offset 
their loss of de jure political power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2008). As it has been shown in post-soviet space, elites tend 
to resist the changes in political power distribution.
Overall, as it is shown, the extent and character of politi-
cal elite integration and differentiation are one of the key ele-
ments to understand the domestic politics. Here a particular 
focus goes on extent of integration and differentiation within 
the elites, and how each is likely to change (Higley, Bayul-
gen, & George, 2003). Yet, it may fall into logic of Iron Law 
of Oligarchy, which shows that even when the identity of the 
elite’ changes, new elites can adopt policies in line with the 
worst practices of their predecessors (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012) . 
As Higley et al. show, strong integration and wide differ-
entiation originated in a compromise through an elite settle-
ment is a precondition for a lasting democratization laying the 
basis for elite and creating shared rules for restrained political 
competitions. It necessitates long experience of costly but in-
conclusive elite conflict, an abrupt political crisis that threatens 
to enflame this conflict, inter-elite negotiations aimed at de-
fusing the immediate crisis and avoiding future ones through 
compromises on basic issues, as well as authoritative and 
skilled leaders who can get allies and supporters to accept 
such compromises (Higley, Bayulgen, & George, 2003). 
Political elite in Georgia are mostly organized around 
powerful leaders and they are not important decision-makers 
and do not represent citizen-group interests. Georgian par-
ties are quite volatile organizations: out of five parties, that 
dominated parliamentary politics under Shevardnadze, three 
collapsed (the Citizen Union of Georgia, the Union of Demo-
cratic Revival and the National Democratic Party) and the oth-
er two – the Industry Will Save Georgia and the New Rightists 
Party – became marginal by 2012 (Jones, 2015). Since the 
Revolution of Roses the only exception is the United National 
Movement which after departure of Saakashvili in 2013 re-
mained active in opposition and represents quite a challenge 
to the ruling Georgian Dream Coalition. Nearly all Georgian 
leaders neglect collaboration with opposition forces and this 
represents serious impediment to the further democratic de-
velopment of the country. The current political landscape of 
Georgia is dominated by billionaire and former prime-minister 
Bidzina Ivanishvili who actually runs the country from shadow. 
Thus, certain informal elites in Georgia gained unlimited ac-
cess to power, while entire government, in their deeds, is try-
ing to meet requests of the newborn “éminence grise”.  
In Russia, the building of monopolies by Russia’s rulers 
became the essence of regime change. When the dominant 
political actors in Russia faced weak constraints to power 
maximization, they opted to guide further regime changes 
along the road of disillusionment toward the rise of authoritari-
anism. At the same time, they could not completely abandon 
certain democratic institutions (first and foremost, elections) 
not only because of the legacy of late-Soviet democratization 
(when these institutions emerged) but also because of the 
need for legitimation of their powers. Instead, they attempted 
to adjust these institutions to their own interests and purpos-
es— very much in spite of Sobchak’s above-mentioned un-
derstating of democracy (Gel’man, 2015).
The Role of Society:
While the elite-based explanations can explain the direction 
of the regime change, they do not produce full and compelling 
explanations on the institutional change as the role of deeper 
and more entrenched actors as culture and informal rules 
are neglected. Moreover, elite are equally affected by lega-
cies and institutions. Comparative political economists argue 
that increasing returns support institutional heterogeneity 
against isomorphic pressures, so institutions gravitate toward 
inertia because the existing distribution of resources tends to 
produce the kind of political decisions in elites that reinforce 
them. The more entrenched a specific institution is, the more 
difficult it becomes to dismantle it because the institution dis-
tributes power resources in a way that supports its continuity 
(Beckert, 2010). 
Furthermore, because of contingent events or influenc-
es, issues can become more relevant to elite groups which 
might trigger their willingness to support and to further enable 
changes from below. (Wegerich, 2001). But a mere focus on 
elites disregards a supply side institutional change from the 
top level can cause resistance or only partial adaptation on 
the lower levels. This could arise because of regional or local 
level resistance to change from above. 
In this light, it becomes essential to consider culture 
and national identity in assuming western values and 
European integration processes. Here should be underlined 
the correlation between the religion and ethnicity in Orthodox 
Christianity and how the latter poses obstacle to the demo-
cratization of the country and the emergence of civil society 
(Rupnik, 1999) . In case of the Russian Federation and 
Georgia Orthodox Church plays negative role in protecting 
rights of religious and sexual minorities (on 17 May 2013 
several thousands of ultra-Orthodox supporters led by 
Orthodox priests were clashing with gay rights activists in 
Tbilisi).
   History represents a core point of many disputes 
and current problems facing today many ex-communist 
countries. Thorny topics include Russia’s tireless bullying the 
EaP countries for their European aspirations, different pace 
of reforms in many Eastern European countries, fierce rows 
in such countries as Poland and Romania on how far to 
probe communist-era collaboration, disagreements  bet-
ween Greeks and Turks over Cyprus, etc.(The Economist , 
2007). Burden of history constantly mattered Russia 
during the last several centuries. Kremlin often tends to 
look at current events through the lens of the past – and 
this is very symptomatic. This situation always creates a 
risk: a shadow of history can be so firmly grasp conscious-
ness that it will affect the decision-making at the present 
(Hedlund, 2012). Here particularly should be stressed that 
only Russia (till 1917) and partially Georgia (till its annexa-
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 tion in 1801) retained historic memory and experience of 
statehood and functioning independent state institutions 
(except Baltic countries), others with no institutional memory 
just represented a part or provinces of different empires and 
major European powers.
   The path dependence theory in economics (or rail track 
gauge effect) deals with situations where solutions to the 
present problems become as a hostage of decisions ta-
ken earlier. It may be technological innovations, from which 
hard to refuse, it may be geographical location of busine-
sses and cities where there are alternatives, but they are 
unattainable. In the area of socio-economic development 
the similar situations can be observed: potentially beneficial 
policies and reforms can be blocked or distorted due to 
historical prejudices, beliefs and traditions. The existing 
practice suggests that the vicissitudes of attempts to reform 
in Russia is difficult to explain without making references to 
the past. Even a superficial glance at the Russian history 
shows that certain institutional arrangements tend to be 
repeated from time to time (Hedlund, 2012).
Kennedy in 2002 coined a new term “transition culture” 
– the ability of states to mobilize society to undertake action
for realization of their strategic needs during post-commu-
nism transformation (Kennedy M. , 2002). According to him, 
transition culture assumes that publics emerged from com-
munist rule need to be educated in the values of capitalism 
and democracy and persuade the society into necessity of 
reforms and mobilize state power for implementing funda-
mental changes. Elite agencies and institutions are the princi-
pal actors of transition culture, and building of European type 
institutions represents a core element in successful transition 
process. It is very difficult to measure the level of “transition 
culture” among post-Soviet republics, but in many instances 
the transition culture was much higher in case of Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia, which was then translated into the suc-
cessful transition process and high speed of their European 
and Euro-Atlantic integration. Here we should mention the 
political will of ruling elites to speed up the transformation 
process and make everything possible to implement EU/IMF 
recommendations. Champion of post-communism transfor-
mation and top-down Europeanization in EU Eastern partner 
countries became Mikheil Saakashvili who was aggressively 
demanding (sometime it was more PR than in-depth reforms) 
implementation of reforms first in Georgia (2003-2012) then in 
Ukraine  (2014-2015).
External Influence:
As we mentioned above many works on transitology made 
generalization on the transformations in Eastern and Central 
Europe as one whole, including e.g. the Russian Federation, 
the Baltic States and the EaP countries. The generalizing ap-
proach has been based on assumptions that these countries 
share certain geopolitically determined historical and cultural 
characteristics that make them all “Eastern European”, there 
are structural and cultural similarities among all these coun-
tries given by their common Communist past which are very 
important in the analysis and prediction of their post-Commu-
nist development (Illner, 1996). 
Roland admits that geopolitics played an important role 
for economies being in transition and which was underesti-
mated by many economists (Roland, 1997). No doubt transi-
tion represents a global “shift toward democracy and market” 
and a very important geopolitical move of Central and Eastern 
European countries towards the West. For many post-Soviet 
republics integration into European institutions became a 
unique historic opportunity to leave the communist past and 
Russian influence for good and this process catalyzed tran-
sition process for certain EU Eastern Partnership countries 
(particularly, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) which was end-
ed by concluding the Association agreements with the Euro-
pean Union in 2014. 
The European post-Soviet space became a subject for 
competition between the West and Russia for influence over 
the European post-Soviet countries. The transition process in 
the mentioned countries was heavily influenced by the West-
Russia relationship and rivalry. Since dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the EU and the US offered assistance to the post-
Soviet countries in a quite different way. External pressures, 
in the form of diffusion, political conditionality, democracy as-
sistance and promotion programs, planting transnational hu-
man rights and democracy networks were more substantial in 
some regions (Baltic countries) than in others (Belarus, Mol-
dova, Ukraine and South Caucasus countries).
Levitsky and Way divided the post–Cold War internation-
al environment into two dimensions: Western leverage (gov-
ernments’ vulnerability to external pressure) and linkage to 
the West (the density of a country’s cooperation with the US, 
the EU, and Western-led international organizations) (Levit-
sky & Way, 2005). Authors used both leverage and linkage for 
measuring the level of authoritarianism during the post–Cold 
War period. However, mechanisms of leverage (diplomatic 
pressure, political conditionality, and military intervention) 
were not commonly used to democratize post–Cold War au-
tocracies. In contrary, as empirical evidences show, diffuse 
effects of linkage contributed more consistently to democra-
tization. 
Levitsky and Way categorize some post-Soviet countries, 
particularly Georgia and Moldova, as low-linkage and high-
leverage countries, both of which have been governed by 
“unstable competitive authoritarian regimes” since dissolution 
of the Soviet Union (Levitsky & Way, 2005). The mentioned 
countries are described as poor and dependent on foreign as-
sistance, which are weakly integrated into the global economy 
and have only limited ties with the West. In each case, auto-
cratic governments fell three times since regaining the inde-
pendence, but neither country democratized. In case of Geor-
gia, both domestic and international pressure forced Eduard 
Shevardnadze to step down in 2003, and then Saakashvili to 
cede power in 2012, but electoral manipulation, embezzle-
ment, wide spread of human rights harassment and perse-
cution of political rivals caused little international response, 
and domestically it triggered mass protests and demands for 
“restoration of justice”. It is not surprisingly that the former 
Prime Ministers of Moldova and Georgia, Vlad Filat and Vano 
Merabishvili respectively were recently arrested under differ-
ent charges. 
On the other hand, Russia was trying to keep its influ-
ence over post-Soviet republics by all possible means (politi-
cal and economic conditionality, trade sanctions and import 
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bans, cutting energy supplies and direct military intervention). 
In December 1991 under Russia’s leadership was founded 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) a successor 
organization of the USSR: 12 former Soviet Republics joined 
the CIS (all except the Baltic States). The CIS originally en-
visaged integration in one economic space including closed 
cooperation in the field of trade, finance, lawmaking and se-
curity.  But already in mid of 90s it became evident that Russia 
wanted to use any possibility to extend its weaken influence 
over the post-Soviet area. Transition process for CIS coun-
tries was quite painful, with intra- and inter-state conflicts, 
revolutions and economic crises, regime change and new 
state building problems. In many instances behind all these 
developments Russia’s long arm can be detected. Besides 
for Russia western liberal-democratic changes on the post-
Soviet space was considered as a threat to Russia’s stability 
and instead the Kremlin was promoting the principle of “the 
managed democracy”, thus supporting the autocratic regimes 
of Lukashenka, Yanukovich, Aliev, Karimov, Nazarbaev etc. 
Due to the geostrategic importance of the post-Soviet 
East European space, the Kremlin continues to take advan-
tage of ethnic divisions and tensions in Ukraine, Moldova and 
the South Caucasus to advance its imperial policies and re-
sists by all means to the European and Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion of the mentioned countries, thus impeding all attempts 
for successful post-communist transformation. After the 2008 
Russian invasion of Georgia and occupation of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, annexation of Crimea and deliberate instiga-
tion of a war in South-East Ukraine, supporting independ-
ence of the Moldovan Transnistrian region it became clear 
that Russia was playing its own game: restoration of Russia’s 
imperial greatness and vassalage in neighborhood by all 
means. On top of that, instability in the Nagorno – Karabakh 
region, where Armenia continue to occupy 20 percent of what 
is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan’s territory, 
benefits Moscow because it allows the Russian regime to 
leverage its influence – especially in Armenia. Erevan, being 
under the heavy pressure from Russia, has recently refused 
to continue negotiations over the Association Agreement with 
the EU and joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. 
Prevalence of Political Rules Over Economic 
Arrangements: 
Political constraints play a major role in decisions on reforms. 
The best known example is the design of the Russian pri-
vatization plan, where the main justification for distribution 
of state assets in Russia was not economic but political one 
(Roland, 2000.). Williamson making references to the study 
of Levy and Spiller regarding privatization in five countries 
concludes that privatization depends on many cases on the 
efficiency and quality of judicial independence, distribution of 
powers between different branches, the competence of regu-
latory institutions and contractual safeguards (Levy & Spiller, 
1994), (Levy & Spiller, 1996), (Williamson, 2000).  As it was 
revealed the “triumphant completion” of privatization in Rus-
sia was quite inadequate assessment: if privatization was a 
success for small firms, it was undoubtedly problematic for 
other companies and especially natural monopolies.    
Here we wished to make references to the work of Olson 
according to whom the large differences in per capita income 
and economic performance cannot be explained by differ-
ences in access to the world’s stock of productive knowledge, 
or to its capital markets, or by differences in the quality of 
marketable human capital or personal culture (Olson, 1996). 
According to Olson “the only remaining plausible explanation 
is that the great differences in the wealth of nations are mainly 
due to differences in the quality of their institutions and eco-
nomic policies” (Olson, 1996, p. 19). That explains some of 
the phenomenon, but, in our point of view, it is too complex 
for such a single explanation. His conclusions over postwar 
economic performances in divided China, Germany and Ko-
rea – where countries being under communist regimes had 
worst economic indicators than the same cultural groups from 
proper China, Germany and Korea, “could surely not be ex-
plained by differences in the marketable human capital of the 
populations at issue” (Olson, 1996, p. 19) In our opinion, this 
comparison shows outcome of economic performance of so-
cieties based on ideological differences as well as differences 
in economical structures and in systems in general (planning 
economy versus market economy) and this explains causes 
of so poor outcome of economic performance of countries be-
ing under the communist rule. 
At the same time, the economic reforms were prioritized 
opening the leeway for apologists of the Washington Con-
sensus. According to Roland facts have vindicated evo-
lutionary-institutionalist perspective and proved that the 
Washington Consensus was detrimental (Roland, 2000.). 
He explains some failures in transition process in former 
Soviet republics by certain unforeseen circumstances: asset 
stripping during mass privatization, development of orga- 
nized crime directly connected with authorities, increase in 
size of shadow economy, resistance of large enterprises to 
tax collection, insurmountable rampant corruption and etc. 
All mentioned events were not predicted neither by the  
Washington Consensus advocates nor the evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective supporters. On the other hand, 
the IMF in 90s “often disregards the history, cultural 
traditions, and national peculiarities of the countries in which 
it was operating” (Papava, 2005). Here we would like to make 
references to the recommendation offered by the IMF 
delegation to Georgia in 1992-1993 requesting the gover-
nment stay in the ruble zone, which caused quite a nega-
tive reaction from the political elite who had ambitions to 
uproot the Soviet imperial legacy as soon as possible. 
Certainly one can consider other reasons for the IMF ruble 
preference at that time, but this only reinforces the point 
about the imbalance of expertise in transition process, 
particularly for post-Soviet European countries (Kennedy, 
2014).  As Jones puts it, “the IMF’s design for post-Soviet 
states, almost Bolshevik in scope and conviction, contri-
buted to the political instability and economic decline it was 
designed to avoid, and intensi-fied the tension between eco-
nomic and political liberalization of Georgia” (Jones, 2015).  
Conclusion
Despite the heavy criticism and uncovered fallacies of tran-
sitology in the academic literature, its ideas on sources of 
change based on neoliberal presumptions of linearity of 
change sustain in media, policy-making and even academic 
circles, while many countries that supposedly embarked on 
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the path of democratic transition towards this “endpoint” have 
stalled in their progress. Moreover, what is observed is that 
the old institutions and rules continue to shape the political-
economic interactions within the societies turning these coun-
tries into “competitive authoritarian regimes”. 
To address this issue, in this paper we highlight that 
the the transformation or persistence of rules depends on a 
number of interdependent factors. To assess the degree of 
transformation or persistence of rules, we emphasize the im-
portance not only elites as a factor but also legacies, insti-
tutions and external interventions (leverage and linkage) in 
explaining post-soviet transformations. Importance of lega-
cies and institutions in guiding subsequent choices and allo-
cation of resources is underlined by the primary fact that nei-
ther of the countries of the region represents an institutional 
“tabula rasa”. In post-soviet countries unlike CEE countries or 
Southeastern Europe upon the demise of communism weak 
institutional and political constraints emerged setting a solid 
foundation for domestic actors to pursue their goals much 
more successfully in fortifying their political and economic 
power and their actions were guided by the norms and rules 
dominant at that period of time. Hence, their subsequent de-
mise when happened led to the continuation of their policies 
by their successors. In this regard, the influence of the exist-
ing political and economic institutions is paramount in under-
standing the dominant rules of the game, allocation of power 
and resources within the system.
In post-soviet countries, there are many examples of 
regime change which led to little change. Yet, regimes, their 
sets of actors and rules can and do change over time. To 
understand how and why it happens, this review article tries 
to point at the intertwining factors and multifaceted nature 
of institutional change. To evaluate better the persistence of 
rules and the trajectory of change, we point at importance of 
the elites, the state of the society and its ability to demand or 
preserve its acquired rights, which are in turn interdependent 
with existing culture and legacies, and finally geopolitics and 
international influence, the level of linkage and leverage with 
the regional powers and their strategies as key factors. These 
potential factors affect the distribution of power in political and 
economic institutions, which suggests that change is about 
creating a level playing field by imposing the same rules for 
all actors.
Exploring the interplay of these factors is an important 
area of study and it should be explored more in depth to 
understand better why and when institutional change takes 
place in future research.
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